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Habitual creativity: Revising habit, reconceptualising creativity 
 
Vlad Glăveanu 
London School of Economics 
 
Abstract 
Current psychological scholarship is based on a dichotomy between habit, associated with 
automatic reflex behaviour, and creativity, which involves deliberation, purpose and heuristic 
procedures. However, this account is problematic and contradicts everyday experience where 
mastery, for instance, is one of the highest levels of creative performance achieved within a 
habitual practice. This article argues that such a separation misrepresents both habit and 
creativity with important theoretical and practical consequences. A first step towards 
reconciling the two terms is made by revisiting a series of foundational strands of theory from 
psychology and related disciplines. In light of these sources, habit is reformulated as a social, 
situated and open system and habitual creativity defined as the intrinsically creative nature of 
customary action, reflected in the way habits adjust to dynamic contexts, the way they are 
used, combined and ultimately perfected. Further distinctions are then made between habit, 
improvisation and innovation. Both improvisational and innovative creativity are embedded 
in habitual forms and this is well illustrated by craftwork: a practiced type of activity on the 
basis of which artisans improvise, whenever obstacles or difficulties are encountered, and 
even get to innovate, when their intention is to generate novel artefacts or work techniques. 
 
Keywords: creativity, habit, improvisation, innovation, pragmatism, folk art. 
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“We may borrow words from a context less technical than that of biology, and 
convey the same idea by saying that habits are arts. They involve skill of 
sensory and motor organs, cunning or craft, and objective materials. They 
assimilate objective energies, and eventuate in command of environment. They 
require order, discipline, and manifest technique. They have a beginning, middle 
and end. Each stage marks progress in dealing with materials and tools, advance 
in converting material to active use” (Dewey, 1922, p. 15; emphasis added) 
 
 The present article aims to address the enduring dichotomy between creative and 
habitual behaviour. This dichotomy stands at the core of thinking not only about creativity 
but about human action in general and human society; it articulates greater philosophical 
concerns for understanding continuity and change, and the relationship between the “old” and 
the “new”. What is attempted here is the elaboration of an account that transcends such 
oppositional categories and reveals the co-constitutive nature of creativity and habit, change 
and continuity, the new and the old. The notion of “habitual creativity”, developed in this 
context, argues simultaneously for the creativity of habitual action and the habitual nature of 
creativity. It is a concept that can find applicability in theorising creativity as a whole, from 
more “minor” forms to “celebrated” creative achievements. However, the greatest 
contribution this notion makes is arguably towards our understanding of everyday life 
creativity, with the help of which “we adapt flexibly, we improvise, and we try different 
options” (Richards, 2007, p. 26) in our day to day existence. Many of the examples in this 
discussion therefore come from studies of folk art, conducted by the author, but are not 
limited to these. Fruitful parallels are also made with other forms of artistic expression, to 
music and jazz performances in particular, and any other everyday activities that require 
practice and mastery in execution. To achieve this broad aim, the article both reviews several 
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strands of current empirical work and aims to recuperate theoretical insights from 
foundational scholarship in psychology and related disciplines in order to develop a more 
comprehensive, cross-disciplinary perspective on both habit and creativity.  
An apparent paradox: Creativity as mastery 
 The inquiry into the relationship between creativity and habit was prompted by a set 
of empirical investigations of craft activities, in particular Easter egg decoration in Romanian 
communities (AUTHOR REFERENCES). This folk art can be considered habitual at many 
levels, starting from cataloguing the whole of it as a custom, a “social or community habit”, 
to looking at its inner organisation of action where different techniques of decoration require 
different habits (for example decoration with leaves, with wax, etc.) and ending, at a more 
micro-level, with the exercised and habitual depiction of motifs and patterns. At all these 
levels one can see the expression of creativity. Decorators do not only reproduce the tradition, 
but “intelligently adapt customs to conditions, and thereby remake them” (Dewey, 1934, p. 
75). The repetition of a pattern itself is not essentially a routine or mechanical process, and 
can “also be an opportunity for personal interpretation of that pattern” (Weiner, 2000, p. 153). 
Finally, just like in music where “spontaneity in performance is not an illusion” and 
“repeated performances generally differ in small but musically significant ways” (Chaffin, 
Lemieux & Chen, 2006, p. 200), each presentation of a motif is at the same time a re-
presentation of it, a re-creation. Most importantly, higher levels of creativity in this craft (as 
appreciated by both artisans themselves and their customers) are associated with the 
continuous efforts to perfect the work, to achieve mastery over the technique. The 
“remarkable intuitive sensitivity” (Dobbins, 1980, p. 38) that describes folk artists in any 
domain is the outcome of years of practice – of working at least a first “thousand eggs”, as 
commented by one of the decorators. It is the nature and characteristics of this mastery that 
need to be unpacked for a better understanding of both habit and creativity. 
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 In light of the above, mastery can be defined as the uppermost expression of habitual 
practice, at which action has been so well exercised and internalised that it often becomes 
associated with advanced forms of creative expression. The fundamental question to be asked 
here is similar to Caffin, Lemieux and Chen‟s (2006) interrogation concerning the activity of 
musicians: “how can performance be both creative and highly automatic at the same time?” 
or, in other words, how can mastery involve both routinised habit and creativity of the highest 
degree? This relationship can be visually represented by an almost perfect circle, like the one 
depicted in Figure 1. In this representation habit and creativity are positioned on a continuum 
that, at all points, involves an integrated manifestation of both. Often, when the habit is still 
not fully formed, outcomes appear to be more novel in relation to conventional ways of work. 
Conversely, a powerful habit might reduce variation at a surface level while encouraging 
micro-changes and necessary adjustments of the technique. However, to assume that, as habit 
grows stronger, the (perceived) creative quality diminishes would be incorrect and this is 
reflected by the “extremities” of the continuum in Figure 1 not being opposed to one another 
but coming together in what is called mastery: the highest level of habitual action associated 
with the highest level of creative expression. In order to become more creative one needs not 
to “break” with habit, as commonly thought, but to advance in mastering it.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of mastery 
HIGH LEVEL OF 
HABITUAL ACTION 
HIGH LEVEL OF   
CREATIVE EXPRESSION 
MASTERY 
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 In the psychological literature to date this concern for how repetition and practice 
contribute to higher achievement and creativity has been considered in studies on expertise. 
Again a central concern for this kind of investigations is to challenge the “widespread belief 
that all types of practice involve mere drill that is designed to attain rapid and effortless 
automaticity” (Ericsson, 1998, p. 89). In other terms, how can novices move to an expert 
level in their practice without levelling off their performance after automatisation? This 
question has been answered by Ericsson (1998, 1999, 2003) in a theory of expertise that 
centres around “deliberate practice”. In summary, an improvement in performance is not an 
automatic consequence of additional practice (the mere repetition of the same activity day 
after day) but the result of constantly raising the difficulty of the exercise and thus engaging 
in activities that require incremental development. The key element here, in Ericsson‟s view, 
is that such exercise needs to be deliberate, intentionally designed and carried out. In other 
words, the learner, sometimes assisted by a teacher or coach, needs to find suitable training 
tasks and master them sequentially (Ericsson, 2006, p. 692). In his work Ericsson (2003, 
2006) presented numerous examples of successful deliberate practice activities (in sports, 
chess, typing, etc.) and thus built a picture of mastery and expertise acquisition that revolves 
around concentration and awareness rather than mindless repetition of the task. Far from 
falling prey to routines, the path to mastery “involves problem-solving, iterative refinement, 
and at higher levels of skill the development of internal representations for planning, 
evaluating and monitoring mental representations” (Ericsson, Roring & Nandagopal, 2007, 
pp. 21-22). This resonates with the usual practice of expert craftsmen, whose work 
necessarily requires concentration and rhythm, a coordination between hand and eye that 
balances “repetition and anticipation” (Sennett, 2008, p. 176). Easter egg decorators for 
instance, make regular changes in their work, commonly in relation to the motifs they depict 
and sometimes even the work technique they use. Learning the craft does not involve 
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reproducing the same motif endlessly but passing from simpler to more complex ornaments 
in an effort to create novel, more “beautiful” patterns (AUTHOR REFERENCE). What 
Ericsson‟s theoretical framework shows, and these empirical examples argue for as well, is 
that it is not only preferable but vitally important for novices and experts alike “to avoid 
mindless memorization and automatization of skilled performance in order to continue 
improving and increasing control over their performance” (Ericsson, 1998, p. 94).       
 If we understand expertise as related to constant change and self-challenge then we 
can legitimately ask whether creativity is the same as expertise or, to put it differently, 
whether creativity always requires expertise. There are many authors today who are ready to 
highlight the deep connections between them; Sternberg (1998, 2001), for instance, famously 
advocated for a view of giftedness (and abilities more generally) as forms of developing 
expertise. However, alternative explanations of the creative process have also been put 
forward, most notably Simonton‟s (2007) perspective of creativity defined in terms of a 
Darwinian process of blind-variation (although this “chance model” generally received until 
now limited empirical support, see Kozbelt, 2008). Furthermore, a “tension” between 
creativity and expertise (see Weisberg, 2006, p. 766) is often postulated based on several 
accounts, among them the pervasive association between expertise and an automatic way of 
responding to a situation, anchored in the past, while creativity intentionally breaks with past 
experience. Taking several cases studies of creative achievement, both Weisberg (2006) and 
Simonton (2003a) reached the similar conclusion that expertise may very well be a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for creativity. Indeed, mastery of a specific domain helps creative 
performance in that area but leaves unexplained all those instances in which people are 
creative without being experts (the classic example being when they answer much more 
general creativity tests). This reinforces componential models of creativity (see Amabile, 
1996), postulating the interaction between both domain-general and domain-specific skills in 
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creative action. Returning to the tension view though we can also find arguments for why 
“too much expertise” may be detrimental for creative activity (see Simonton, 2003a, p. 229). 
This line of thought is supported by a frequent connection between expertise and increased 
inflexibility and narrowness in thinking and action. Exploring further the notion of “cognitive 
entrenchment”, Dane (2010) came to the conclusion that there might be a trade-off between 
mastery and flexibility or even creativity but this is not necessarily always the case. In fact 
Ericsson has offered a well-grounded rebuttal of the tension view and presented evidence 
suggesting that experts “generate better actions than their less skilled peers even in situations 
they have never directly experienced” (Ericsson, 1999, p. 331) and are also capable of 
adjusting their performance to changing contexts both before and during the competition 
(Ericsson, 1998), thus disputing the idea that mastery is inflexible and fully automated. 
 What can be concluded from the above is the fact that expertise is certainly an 
important condition for higher level creative achievement but this does not imply that all 
experts are extremely creative or that beginners necessarily show little or no creativity. The 
question remains of how exactly mastery, acquired through deliberate practice, facilitates 
creative expression? As alluded to before, for Ericsson the key to understanding expertise lies 
in the “refined mental representations” expert performers develop, representations able to 
“maintain accessibility to relevant information and to support more extensive and flexible 
reasoning about an encountered task or situation” (Ericsson, 1998, p. 91). Indeed, 
automatization of action comes with a series of benefits, among them the fact that it frees 
mental resources and helps us focus on other aspects of the task while performing it. In the 
words of Sternberg, Kaufman and Grigorenko (2008, p. 309), “in general, automatization lets 
people take in more of the world, and learn more” and, we would continue, become more 
creative in engaging with the world. What is the mechanism behind this accomplishment? 
Perhaps one of the most interesting attempts to explain this process comes from Caffin, 
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Lemieux and Chen (2006) who dealt specifically with musical performances. Their premise 
is simple: “if the musician is not paying attention to the music, then a performance can easily 
be automatic and lack the important qualities of vitality and spontaneity” (p. 201). On the 
other hand, focusing too much on pitfalls and mistakes can make the outcome equally 
uncreative. What increases creativity is in fact thinking about interpretative and expressive 
goals while playing and detecting the cues that are associated with these particular qualities. 
Rehearsals of the composition ensure that performance cues “come to mind automatically and 
effortlessly as the piece unfolds, eliciting the highly practiced movements” (p. 202). It is only 
through practice that such prompts can become an integral part of the recital and only so can 
the musician free him/herself from monitoring each and every movement and perfect those 
particular elements which give the whole performance its creative value. “Use of 
performance cues is”, in fact, “an attention strategy that maintains conscious control of a 
highly automated performance” (p. 215). The authors proposed a hierarchical classification of 
cues in the case of music: basic, interpretative and expressive. Mastery is achieved after 
considerable practice when basic and interpretative aspects of the performance have been 
fully integrated and the artist can focus entirely on expressive prompts. Examples from Easter 
egg decoration offer further support for the explanation above. In this craft the performance 
cues that most non-expert decorators attend to have to do with how straight the lines are, if 
the model is symmetric, if colours have the proper shade, etc. On the contrary, experienced 
artisans who mastered the habit of drawing on the egg can “free” their attention from 
technical details, focus on aesthetic qualities and thus seize all opportunities for adding a 
personal element to the model being depicted. 
 In conclusion, understanding the apparent mastery–creativity “paradox” requires us to 
think about the dynamic between attachment or immersion into a domain of practice and 
detachment, the capacity to creatively transgress its current state and envision its future 
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dimensions. Unfortunately however, this reality has rarely been theorised as such in 
mainstream psychology, and mainstream creativity research. Moreover, as argued above, the 
concepts of habit, practice, exercise, repetition, etc. have notoriously been treated with 
suspicion when it came to performance and creativity due to their assumed association with 
automated and mindless routines. If the work of Ericsson and others managed to “rescue” 
practice and exercise (in their deliberate versions) from this harmful conceptualisation, very 
little has been discussed until now about habit, itself an outcome of and a powerful drive 
behind exercised forms of practice. Several reasons for this are explored as follows.  
Theoretical difficulties: Creativity versus habit in psychology 
 It is a working assumption in psychology and beyond that human behaviour has a 
“dual tendency”, one leading towards innovation and creation, the other towards habituation 
(Crossley, 2001, p. 129). This either/or type of relationship is widespread not only in 
scientific theory (where habit is considered “the most obvious barrier to creative thinking and 
innovation”; Davis, 1999, p. 166) but also common sense and, on the whole, “any discussion 
of creativity or innovation necessarily introduces a general opposed concept of habit” 
(Dalton, 2004, p. 604). This dualistic view has of course important consequences since it 
fundamentally ends up segmenting human experience into creative and uncreative or 
habitual. Such a distinction makes creativity a rare and unique moment in our existence – 
given the old formulated view that habits cover a very large part of life (James, 1890) – an 
exception rather than the rule of behaviour. Our modern-day mythologies of genius and the 
gap between creativity and everyday life (see Glӑveanu, 2010a) steam from a difference like 
this and contribute to isolating and disconnecting creative expression from lived experience. 
It is thus important to understand what the bases for the presumed dichotomy are and, in 
order to do this, we need to consider the psychological interpretation of habit. 
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 The term habit largely derives from the Latin verb habere meaning “to have” or 
“hold” and its meaning in psychology has been relatively constant throughout the last 
century. William James (1890, p. 107) for example equated habit with “sequences of 
behaviors, usually simple (...) that have become virtually automatic”. Automaticity as a 
central characteristic of habit makes it both a useful and desired process and a potential threat 
in our interactions with others. James himself encouraged the formation of habits out of 
“useful actions” and warned against turning unfavourable behaviours into habits; on the 
whole he considered that “the more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the 
guard effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free 
for their own proper work” (p. 122). This kind of assertions, frequently found in the writings 
of prominent thinkers, helped psychologists separate habitual from reflexive action, 
consciousness from habit (despite empirical examples that argue for a closer unity between 
thinking and doing, see Sutton, 2007). Indeed, it became common knowledge that “the things 
we have learned to do best, (...) require least thought, direction, feeling, consciousness” 
(Baldwin, 1900, p. 168). The “breaking” of habit tends to take place when the relation 
between organism and environment is “ill-defined and subject to frequent and profound 
alterations” (MacDougall, 1911, p. 327) since in these cases automatic responses become 
inadequate. Habit thus ends up being reflected upon and changed accordingly and often these 
changes are themselves practiced and integrated in future behavioural routines. A circular 
picture of human development is therefore painted, going, in the words of MacDougall, 
“from pre-existing habit through accommodation to later modified habit” (p. 326).  
 Our contemporary understanding of habit however is largely shaped by an even 
narrower reading of the phenomenon imposed by behaviourism (see Wozniak, 1994). While 
this school made habit the centrepiece of psychological research, it also reduced it to reflexes 
and grounded it in human biology, glossing over its psychological and cultural aspects. For 
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John B. Watson (1914, 1919) habit is a system of acquired reflexes related to muscular and 
glandular changes whenever the organism is exposed to a specific stimulus. Advocating an 
image of the human being as a “sum of instincts and habits”, Watson achieved not only to do 
away with consciousness as a psychological topic, but also to lower habits to the level of 
simple repeated reactions and nothing else. What followed was an impressive programme of 
behavioural research into the laws and manifestation of habit. Hull (1943, 1951) for instance 
concluded, based on his studies on humans and animals, that the automaticity of habit 
increases steadily with each repetition until it reaches a plateau, in a kind of asymptotic 
curve. Research like the above normally included physiological indicators and the neurology 
of habit continues to attract attention to the present day (see Graybiel, 2008). Indebted to the 
behaviourist legacy, recent scholarship takes habit to be an automatic gesture (Lally, van 
Jaarsveld, Potts & Wardle, 2010) based on the association between a cue and a response 
(Orbell & Verplanken, 2010). Habits are said to be “learned through a process in which 
repetition incrementally tunes cognitive processors in procedural memory (i.e., the memory 
system that supports the minimally conscious control of skilled action)” (Neal, Wood & 
Quinn, 2006, p. 198). Considering the advantages of habits for human functioning, Wood, 
Quinn and Kashy (2002, p. 1259) refer to aspects such as cognitive economy, performance 
efficiency and greater feeling of control. However, on the down side, the authors mention 
ineffective repetition and the general view of people that habits are relatively uninformative 
about the self and so they end up being negatively evaluated. This can be partially explained 
also by the opposition between habit and creativity.  
 Unlike habit, creativity is largely appreciated as a social value (Mason, 2003), and its 
value accentuated by the fact that creativity “involves going beyond the habituated. It moves 
beyond the standard, repeated routines of everyday life” (Borofsky, 2001, p. 66). 
Consequently, creative products are more “esteemed” and expressive of self. Shattering “the 
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rule of law and regularity of mind” is considered the core of creative processes (Barron, 
1990, p. 249) and there are deep and meaningful associations being made between creativity 
and personal and societal progress. Indeed, in the Western world it is not uncommon to 
consider tradition as “backward” and repetition as “uncreative” (Weiner, 2000, p. 153), and 
this pushes habit further away from creation and its “forward”, progressive moments. Why is 
there a gap between creativity and habit? To answer this question one only needs to look at 
basic definitions of creativity which link creative action to situations where “a person has no 
learned or practiced solution to a problem” (Torrance, 1988, p. 57). The reverse of habit thus 
becomes a definition for creativity. Adding to the above, Amabile (1996, p. 35) included the 
heuristic nature of the task as part of the creative process. Unlike algorithms, heuristic paths 
might not have a clearly defined goal and do not unfold in a straightforward manner. This 
contrasts largely with the routine ways of doing things associated with habit. Finally, Gruber 
and Wallace (1999), as well as Weisberg (1993), insisted on making purposeful behaviour a 
condition for creativity. The postulate of intentionality not only safeguards creative 
expression from mere accidental discoveries but it also distinguishes it from habitual, 
automatic responses. Such distinctions are paralleled by common-sense thinking on the topic 
where, as noticed by Baldwin (1906, p. 100) early on, phrases like “divine creation” and 
“slavish imitation” depict a very clear hierarchy of values.  
 The opposition between creativity and habit or tradition however is not only 
misplaced but highly problematic and detrimental for our understanding of both phenomena. 
With reference to this, Negus and Pickering (2004, p. 68) discussed the “beguiling but 
misleading view” that equates creativity with “freedom, agency and the unshackling of 
constraints”. This assumption ignores the crucial role of conventions and repeated practices 
for creative expression while at the same time supporting the claim that “tradition stultifies 
innovation and stupefies creativity” (Wilson, 1984, p. viii). Oppositions like these cannot be 
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sustained in the face of theoretical and practical arguments. To support the split between 
creativity and habit or tradition would be as illogical as arguing that fantasy is the opposite of 
memory (Vygotsky, 2004). Moreover, this dichotomy poses some conceptual dilemmas for 
many performance arts like music whenever a forceful distinction is imposed between 
creativity and technical mastery (Graham, 1998). It becomes thus important to acknowledge 
that all the above difficulties in conceptualisation derive from a particular understanding of 
habit as mindless and uncreative routine. However, this is not the only understanding 
available and there are vigorous strands of scholarship both in psychology and sociology that 
directly address this deep-seated dichotomy and aim to transcend it. It is to these critical 
approaches that we turn to next. 
Recovering the meaning of habitual behaviour 
 The concept of habit has a very long history (longer than the term “creativity”), being 
used by Greek and medieval thinkers, major figures of the Enlightenment, and finding a place 
also in the philosophy of Kant, Mill and Hegel. Reviewing the historical trajectory of the 
term, Charles Camic (1986) noted that, despite centuries of moderately similar usage, the 
notion was radically transformed from the 19
th
 century onwards by the physiological 
literature that reduced it to acquired reflexes, and the psychological approach that cemented 
this meaning. Kilpinen (2009) more recently distinguished between two different definitions: 
a “Humean” variant considering habits to be routine-like behaviours outside of 
consciousness, rationality and intentionality, and a more “pragmatist” conception 
understanding habits as open to reflection during the course of action. It is this second 
meaning we are aiming to recuperate, a meaning that transpires clearly from the important 
contributions of James Mark Baldwin, John Dewey, Hans Joas and Pierre Bourdieu.  
 For Baldwin habit, referred to more broadly as the principle of habit, “expresses the 
tendency of the organism to secure and retain its vital stimulations” (Baldwin, 1900, p. 216). 
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This principle is complementary to that of accommodation or the learning of new 
adjustments. Accommodation here leads to invention and it would be easy to fall prey to a 
dichotomy between habit and invention. However, Baldwin specifically rejects such a view 
when he states that “accommodation is in each case simply the result and fruit of the habit 
itself which is exercised” (p. 217) or, in other words, “accommodation is reached simply in 
the ordinary routine of habit, and is its outcome” (p. 218). Baldwin‟s writings also offer of a 
very good example of how the notion of imitation can be placed at the centre of a theory of 
human psychology and development. His thesis in this regard can be summarised as follows: 
“In the individual, invention is as natural as imitation. Indeed normal imitation is rarely free 
from invention!” (pp. 149-150). Baldwin‟s conception thus starts from the premise that 
imitation (especially what he calls “persistent imitation”, an expression of will) requires 
invention and this allowed him to regard imitation as the law of progressive interaction 
between the organism and environment (Baldwin, 1894, 1903). According to him: 
  
“In all the processes of social absorption and imitation, therefore, we find that the 
individual thinks and imagines in his own way. He cannot give back unaltered what 
he gets, as the parrot does. He is not a repeating machine. His mental creations are 
much more vital and transforming. Try as he will he cannot exactly reproduce; and 
when he comes near to it his self-love protests and claims its right to do its own 
thinking” (Baldwin, 1911, pp. 151-152). 
  
 The above vision can be related to the American philosophical tradition of 
pragmatism, a system of thinking that intended to challenge many of the deep-seated 
dichotomies ingrained in much of Western philosophy. John Dewey, as one of the leading 
figures of this orientation, based his psychological and philosophical writings on a “principle 
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of continuity” in order to counteract dualistic paradigms (see Alexander, 2006, p. 189). And 
one of the many oppositions Dewey was eager to transcend was the one between habit, seen 
as necessarily conservative, and thought, understood as the origin of progress (and thus 
creativity). For Dewey, “thought which does not exist within ordinary habits of action lacks 
means of execution” and thus condemns our actions to becoming “clumsy, forced” (Dewey, 
1922, p. 67). Sadly though, this insight has been largely overlooked in the decades that 
followed, especially during the age of behaviourism. 
 The starting point of Dewey‟s theoretical construction of habits rests in the fact that 
habits, like all other psychological and behavioural functions, require the cooperation of 
organism and environment (Dewey, 1922, p. 14). They are not foreign elements of our 
psychological system but form an intimate part of ourselves, which comes to explain the 
power some habits can have over us (p. 24). As a working definition, we can think of them in 
terms of a human activity which is influenced by prior activity (acquired), contains an 
ordering of elements of action, is projective and dynamic in quality and remains operative 
even when not in explicit use. Most importantly, Dewey encouraged us to “protest against the 
tendency in psychological literature to limit [habit‟s] meaning to repetition” and clearly stated 
that “repetition is in no sense the essence of habit” (pp. 41-42) and neither is “mechanization” 
(p. 70); in contrast: “Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of 
stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It 
means will” (p. 42). The assertions above are very much representative of the pragmatist 
position for which “intentionality (or rationality) without habituality is empty, whereas 
habituality without intentionality and rationality of course is blind” (Kilpinen, 2009, p. 105).  
 Moreover, this philosophical orientation has given us a clear description not only of 
the relationship between habit and thought, but also between habit, action and creativity. For 
instance, in a more recent elaboration, Hans Joas (1996) advocates for a vision of creativity 
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as an analytical dimension of all human action. In this view creativity is not a different type 
of action in itself, alongside “rational”, “normative” or “impulsive” behaviour, but permeates 
all of our manifestations and therefore needs to have a central role in a discussion of human 
agency. We should also note here the two main tasks mind performs in relation to action, in 
light of a pragmatist philosophy: “it monitors or supervises the ongoing action process, and it 
reconstructs that process if it fails” (Joas & Kilpinen, 2006, p. 325). The idea of action failure 
is in fact central for pragmatists and one of the most important ways in which creativity is 
manifested in the course of activity – reflecting on the outcome and on the possible means to 
overcome the difficulty. This association between obstacles and creativity needs to be 
remembered since, as we shall see, it was scrutinised by later scholarship (Dalton, 2004). 
 For the moment we can note as well the fact that Joas‟s critique of rational or 
normative action resonates with the tenets of Pierre Bourdieu‟s genetic sociology. In order to 
understand “how can behaviour be regulated without being the product of obedience to 
rules?” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 65), Bourdieu proposed the notion of habitus. Often referred to 
as a “feel for the game” or a “practical sense”, the habitus is a system of dispositions in the 
sense that individuals are disposed, not determined, to act in a certain way based on previous 
experience (Bourdieu, 1990b). These dispositions are said to be durable (once formed, they 
last throughout the lifetime) and transportable or able to generate similar practices in different 
domains. Importantly, they are structures of perception and appreciation simultaneously 
structured by objective social conditions and structuring these conditions through the 
generation of flexible practices. The habitus is therefore marked by its historicity: “a product 
of history, produces individual and collective practices – more history – in accordance with 
the schemes generated by history” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 54). In contrast to the more 
psychological or physiological reflex-based definitions of habits, for Bourdieu habitus is a 
thoroughly social construction, “the social embodied” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 128). 
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It is acquired through socialisation, especially in early childhood, and related to particular and 
long lasting experiences of a social position in society (Bourdieu, 1990a). It can be easily 
seen in consequence how habitus reflects the social hierarchy and is greatly shaped by the act 
of belonging to a certain social class (see Bourdieu, 1984).  
 From the above what clearly transpires is the sophisticated way in which Pierre 
Bourdieu managed to bridge the traditional gap between habit and creativity. Habitus is 
simultaneously firm and supple, “an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected 
to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or 
modifies its structures” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 133). Habitus may be durable, but it 
is also “endlessly transformed” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 116), an authentic “art of inventing” 
(Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 55). There is no one-to-one link between a habitus and a single type of 
unchanging practice. Neither is habitus a form of social norm or a law people have to obey 
unwillingly. On the contrary, this “feel of the game (...) enables an infinite number of 
„moves‟ to be made, adapted to the infinite number of possible situations which no rule, 
however complex, can foresee” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 9). As such, “the habitus goes hand in 
glove with vagueness and indeterminacy” (p. 77), obeying a “practical logic” defined by 
every new interaction with the world. However, there are also limits to the creativity of 
habitus and these “limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its 
production” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 55). What the habitus produces in fact are “all the 
„reasonable‟, „common-sense‟ behaviours (and only these) which are possible within the 
limits of these regularities, and which are likely to be positively sanctioned” by society (pp. 
55-56). Concrete circumstances have the capacity to change the expression of habitus but 
even here Bourdieu reminds us that most experiences we have tend to confirm our habitus, 
since people generally look for / encounter familiar situations (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
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 In conclusion, Baldwin‟s acts of imitation, Dewey‟s and Joas‟s habitual action and 
Bourdieu‟s habitus all acknowledge the relative stability of repeated behaviour but couple it 
with a significant potential for change, reflection and even will (within personal, social and 
historical limits). Their perspectives are therefore ultimately in agreement about habits and 
their role for the individual and for society as a whole. It is this unitary vision that will be 
taken in the present article as a starting point for a new elaboration of the notion of creativity.  
Defining and locating habitual creativity 
 In the previous section foundational perspectives from psychology, philosophy and 
sociology were recovered in thinking about habit, habitual action and creativity. For Baldwin, 
Dewey, Joas and Bourdieu conceptualising habit is not possible outside of creativity and a 
comprehensive image of human action unattainable without both. In the remainder of this 
article a theory of creativity based on habit will be proposed, a theory that builds on all the 
accounts presented above. What brings together the four authors is precisely an 
understanding of habit as a social, situated and open system. For all of them, without 
exception, habits are social in nature. Mainstream psychological literature claims the acquired 
or learned nature of habit but it largely fails to do justice to the social interaction behind it, 
little less the societal dynamic intrinsic to the formation and expression of habits. Pierre 
Bourdieu‟s perspective is perhaps the most illuminating in this regard since for him every 
habitus embodies a history of social relations. Second, habits are very much situated in their 
manifestation and require, as stated by Dewey, the relation between organism and the 
environment. All three terms – the person, the environment, and their relationship – are 
equally dynamic and so habitual action can never be mechanical and deterministic. It needs to 
be open and generative in order to allow for processes of adaptation and growth. The acts of 
imitation mentioned by Baldwin, either “persistent” or not, never duplicate a model of 
behaviour but re-construct it according to changing circumstances. At the same time habits do 
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predispose persons towards particular processes and outcomes, however they should not be 
mistook for simple reflexes that link a narrow “stimulus” to a narrow “response”. This 
reformulation of habit would not only place it back on the agenda of social theorists but it 
could also resolve long-standing arguments over the lack of consciousness, will and creativity 
from habitual action. The degree of automatisation of any one habit varies on the whole with 
its degree of specificity but it never reaches an absolute level of mindless, uncreative routine 
or it would not qualify as a habit. In the words of Küpers (2011, p. 109), “habits can also be 
reflexive” and, as such, a person can take on new habits, change existing ones, de- and re-
habitualise behaviour in a dynamic and creative way. What remains to be theorised here is 
precisely this relationship between creativity and habit and its implications. 
 In essence there are two broad options when it comes to conceptualising this relation: 
either creativity and habit are kept as distinct processes, for as inter-connected as they may 
be, or conceived of as a single type of action. If the first path is taken then “moments” of 
creativity can be distinguished from “moments” of habit and a theory of creativity built on 
how and when creative processes “intervene” in the course of habitual action. On the other 
hand, if creativity and habit concurrently describe action then their separation, even for 
analytical purposes, becomes questionable. This is, in short, the critique raised by Dalton 
(2004) and others (Kilpinen, 1998; Del Mar, 2010) in relation to Joas‟s formulation of 
creative action and its pragmatist sources: it maintains creativity and habit as complementary 
phases and thus conserves the dualism between the two. The problem with pragmatism is 
that, despite its willingness to transcend dichotomic thinking, it nevertheless hypothesised an 
unbreakable link between problems or obstacles and conscious or “creative” thought (see 
Dewey, 1903, 1910). For Mead (1964, p. 7) for instance, “analytical thought commences with 
the presence of problems and the conflict between different lines of activity”. Even Baldwin 
(1903), by referring to a “two-fold factor” of organic activity, kept the distinction between his 
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principle of accommodation and principle of habit. For Dalton this makes creativity 
“episodically” involved in habit, especially when difficulties occur that need creative 
solutions and adaptations. In his view Bourdieu achieved with the notion of habitus a much 
better conceptual integration, although he gave a relatively secondary role to creative 
achievements and restricted them greatly vis-à-vis social constraints. Aiming to reconcile and 
retain the best from both theories, Dalton (2004, p. 604) asserted the “simultaneous presence 
of habitual and creative elements in all moments of action” where actors, in the course of 
habitual acts, “implement contingent techniques suited to the moment” and where “the 
perfection of habit can lead to creative action” (p. 609). 
 Building on this preliminary insight, we can now introduce and define the notion of 
habitual creativity as a further attempt, from a psychological perspective, to overcome the 
dichotomy between habit on the one side and creativity on the other. In a tentative 
formulation, habitual creativity defines the ways in which novelties form an intrinsic part of 
habitual action by constantly adjusting it to dynamic contexts, allowing for transitions 
between and combination of different “routines” and finally perfecting practices, thus 
resulting in mastery. Habitual creativity is, in this regard, the conceptual pair of habitus, 
theorising the same phenomenon but from its “creative end”; the focus on “novelties” in 
behaviour does not override its socially conditioned character but addresses Dalton‟s critique 
of overemphasising structural elements. Habitual creativity is a microgenetic phenomenon 
(with potential sociogenetic effects) and the definition above stresses, without exhausting, the 
many ways in which its dynamics takes place. By far the most agreed upon form of novelty 
emergence in habitual action has to do with the “adjustment to dynamic contexts” mentioned 
at the beginning, a feature that was equally acknowledged by Baldwin, Dewey, Joas and 
Bourdieu as well as many other authors. At a macro level, Weiner (2000, p. 158) asserts that 
“the process of adapting tradition to changed circumstances will always involve some degrees 
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of problem-solving, inventiveness, and/or imaginative expression”. Considering the more 
concrete example of music performance, Caffin, Lemieux and Chen (2006, p. 200) state: 
“Performers adjust to the idiosyncratic demands and opportunities of each occasion. (...) The 
creativity involved in this kind of spontaneous micro-adjustment of a highly prepared 
interpretation makes each performance a creative activity”. And the examples could continue. 
The other two possibilities of combining (interpolating “stretches of previously rehearsed 
behavior”, Bateson, 1999, p. 157) and perfecting habits are on the other hand most clearly 
illustrated by craft activities such as Easter egg decoration and the idea of mastery was 
introduced from the beginning of this article. In the following sections it is important to 
elaborate on the implications of this notion of habitual creativity, principally the grand claim 
that “all creativity is habitual”. Some distinctions will be made afterwards between habit, 
improvisation and innovation without introducing any further dichotomies and oppositions. 
An interesting appendix to this discussion is represented by a brief overview of why 
psychology tended to neglect habit and improvisation for the benefit of innovative behaviour. 
Creativity as habitual 
 Previously the argument was made that all habit is, by definition, creative. The notion 
of habitual creativity is concerned with the reciprocal statement that all creativity is, itself, 
habitual. What this means is that creativity in all instances relies on the existence of habits, of 
known and exercised ways of interacting with the world. Since proposing the creativity of 
habit idea implies the habitual nature of creativity, it is not surprising to find supporting 
statements in this regard within the writings of Baldwin and Dewey. In addressing the issue, 
Baldwin summarised his view as follows: “Let us say, once and for all, that every new thing 
is an adaptation, and every adaptation arises right out of the bosom of old processes and is 
filled with old matter” (Baldwin, 1903, p. 218). Dewey (1934), starting from the premise that 
each great cultural tradition is “an organized habit of vision and of methods of ordering and 
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conveying material” (p. 276, emphasis added), concluded: “[Just like the artist] The scientific 
inquirer, the philosopher, the technologist, also derive their substance from the stream of 
culture. This dependence is an essential factor in original vision and creative expression” (pp. 
276-277). For both authors then the habits formed by taking part in the culture and traditions 
of a society and its different communities are a sine qua non of creative achievement, and this 
is equally valid for all creative domains. Creativity is never “free” from tradition and habit 
and its central characteristic is not to contradict them, but to work from within and continue 
them in new and significant ways. In the words of Feldman (1974, p. 68): “all creative 
thought springs from a base of cultural knowledge and is therefore, by definition, part of a 
cultural tradition – even when it breaks with tradition”.  
 If these assertions are correct, two implications can be derived: first, creators need 
some time to incorporate the “habits of vision and action” of their cultures and master them, 
and second, as cultures and traditions are so diverse creative expression will be channelled 
and manifest itself differently around the world. Both these ideas are supported by the 
psychological literature in which it has long been established that “the human act of creation, 
basically, is a personal reshaping of given materials, whether physical or mental” (Barron, 
1995, p. 313). There is not a hiatus but a continuation between the “new” and the “old” and 
this makes the generation of novelty dependent on processes of socialisation and 
acculturation. Csikszentmihalyi‟s (1999, p. 332) systemic model of creativity emphasised this 
by relating the creator and creation to an existing field and domain: “In order to function well 
within the creative system, one must internalize the rules of the domain and the opinions of 
the field”. This premise is corroborated by research findings suggesting that, usually, big 
creative breakthroughs happen within a decade after mastering the rules of the domain (see 
Gardner, 1994). What is known as the “ten-year rule” originates from the work of Chase and 
Simon (1973) on expert performance in chess and their discovery that players need 
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approximately a decade of practice before great achievement. This rule has been later on 
confirmed in terms of creative activity in several domains (see Hayes, 1989) and, more 
recently, arguments put forward that another ten years might very well be needed after 
achieving expertise in order to reach the level of “creative greatness” (Kaufman & Kaufman, 
2007). Regarding the second assumption, cultural traditions shape not only the mechanisms 
of recognition in cases of such notable breakthroughs but also orient the creative energies of 
individuals and groups. Different talents may well be fostered in different cultural contexts 
(Runco, 2007a, p. 273; also Westwood & Low, 2003), defining the Ortgesit and Zeitgeist of 
different cultural-historical positions in the world (see Simonton, 2003b). As an example, the 
Indian culture has long favoured innovations in the field of spirituality compared to other 
domains (for a review of this see Bhawuk, 2003).  
 The claim that creativity is habitual however goes beyond illustrations of celebrated 
creations and reflects a much deeper, existential dimension. A “habit of being creative” 
(conceptually close to Kilpinen‟s, 2009, notion of “reflexive habituality”) can be 
hypothesised in relation to each and every individual, something akin to what Baldwin (1903, 
p. 220) suggested when he considered “the very fact of accommodation itself the great deep-
seated habit of organic life”. Outside of these biological roots there are also strong cultural 
imperatives to create and Wilson (1984, p. 101) refers in this case to innovation becoming “a 
tradition” in contemporary societies. In her empirical research for instance, Stokes (2001, p. 
356) mentions “Monet‟s high habitual variability level”, thus implying that artists may very 
well habitually impose on themselves the constraint of varying their style, work technique 
and themes. The premise that human life is inherently creative resonates also with the 
psychology of Donald Winnicott (1971, p. 67) who was primarily interested in a universal 
type of creativity, one that “belongs to being alive”.  For him being creative means being able 
to use one‟s whole personality in acts of self expression and is associated with healthy living 
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and functioning. Creativity reveals itself as the rule rather than the exception of human 
existence if we come to think about the continuous, moment to moment, meaning and 
linguistic production of the self and world. As Josephs and Valsiner (2007, p. 55) remind us, 
“semiotic construction is constant and overabundant: the creativity of human psyche is 
generating new meanings while living one‟s life is hyper-productive” (see also Barrett, 1999). 
This basic capacity for creativity we all possess has more recently been conceptualised by 
Beghetto and Kaufman (2007, p. 73) under the term “mini-c”, or the “novel and personally 
meaningful interpretation of experiences, actions, and events”. It doesn‟t matter from this 
perspective if the creative constructions are ephemeral and do not leave a lasting mark on 
human society; as a form of ordinary creativity, they become indispensable and “weave new 
meaning in [individuals‟] lives and relationships” (Bateson, 1999, p. 170). 
 For as appealing as this approach to creativity is, there are also several authors who 
voice their concerns over equating creative action with all human (habitual) action. Negus 
and Pickering (2004, p. 45) for instance warn that “we cannot collapse creativity into 
everyday life, as if they are indistinguishable”. In a similar vein, Hausman (1979, p. 240) 
worries that universalising creativity makes the meaning of the concept “too broad” and 
leaves us incapable of discriminating between creations. However, the notion of habitual 
creativity does not aim to cover all forms of human action in the everyday, since not all 
action is in fact habitual, and it does allow for differentiations in creative expression. Let us 
take these in turn. Human action is habitual but it can also be normative, impulsive, etc. The 
habitual mode of action is certainly pervasive but it doesn‟t exclude other forms of 
manifestation. Bourdieu (1990a, p. 108) acknowledged this when he mentioned that “habitus 
is one principle of production of practices among others and although it is undoubtedly more 
frequent in play than any other (...) one cannot rule out that it may be superseded under 
certain circumstances (...) by other principles, such as rational and conscious computation”. It 
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is for this reason that habitus can be “controlled” and, at times, consciously analysed and 
modified (p. 116). Equally, habitual creativity is “persistent” but also differentiated. To 
understand this we need to consider habits in their relation to improvisation and innovation.  
Habit, improvisation, innovation 
 The psychological theorising of creativity has a long tradition of establishing “types” 
and making distinctions between different “forms” of creative work. Often these come in a 
hierarchy, for example the classical typology by Irvine Taylor (1959), ranging from the 
expressive creativity displayed in spontaneous self-expression up to emergenative creativity 
that constitutes the basis for the formation of new schools of thought. More recent approaches 
refer to a “continuum” of creativity and Cohen and Ambrose (1999, pp. 18-21) for instance 
segmented this range into seven levels: learning something new (universal novelty) – making 
connections that are rare compared to peers – developing talents – developing heuristics – 
producing information – creating by extending a field – creating by transforming a field. 
What can be noted from the above is that usually classifications of creativity tend to be 
formulated around outcome criteria and especially consider the “value” and “novelty” of the 
outcome. To simplify things, many authors employ a straightforward dichotomy between big 
C, mature creativity or H-creativity (historical creativity) on the one hand, and little c, 
mundane creativity or P-creativity (personal creativity) on the other (see Craft, 2001; Cohen 
& Ambrose, 1999; Boden, 1994). The common view behind such distinctions was 
metaphorically summarised by John Liep (2001, p. 12) when he said: “If „conventional 
creativity‟ spreads like an ocean on the surface of the world, „true creativity‟ rises like islands 
here and there”. There are many assumptions packed into formulations such as these, the 
most obvious being the existence of a “true” creativity that is both very rare and noticeable. 
However, separating true or exceptional and conventional or everyday creativity soon runs 
into conceptual problems since “one confers on the term a rarefied and occasionally mystical 
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air, the other can make the word seem commonplace and even banal. Rarely have the links 
between both these senses of the term creativity been retained and explored” (Negus & 
Pickering, 2004, p. 1). It is precisely this exploration of links between different 
manifestations of creativity that is attempted here. Moreover, in light of our previous 
discussion, the different types of creative expression mentioned next will not be considered as 
separate, thus resulting in “distinct forms” of creativity, or hierarchical, thus reflecting an 
organisation based on value of outcome.  
 The three types proposed are those of habitual, improvisational and innovative 
creativity. Of these habitual creative processes has been addressed already and the earlier 
section supported a strong claim that saw all creativity as ultimately based on the expression 
of habit. This raises the question of how is it then possible to postulate other types of 
creativity without contradicting this premise. To begin with, there surely are some differences 
between the emergence of novelty resulting out of the practice of habitual action and the 
emergence of novelty resulting from dealing with obstacles (sometimes) faced during this 
action. The latter is specifically what Joas (1996) and the pragmatists consider to be creativity 
in the strict sense of the word. This dilemma can be solved if we envision habit, 
improvisation and innovation not as separate “entities” ordered in any kind of continuum, but 
as embedded within each other. As a result, the difference between the three is not that 
improvisation and innovation “break” with habit, they are still grounded in forms of habitual 
action (see the section before), but the processes they denote show particularities equally due 
to the external and internal-psychological circumstances of the creator. To be more explicit, it 
is argued that we can talk about improvisational creativity when there is an obstacle or 
difficulty in the course of habitual action that requires some form of interruption and 
deliberation. Further, we can call innovative creativity the process of dealing with such 
obstacle or difficulty when there is a clear intention on the part of the actor to generate novel 
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solutions (in the purest form, the intention to “create”). These features are summarised in 
Figure 2. Before analysing further this classification it should be mentioned that the meaning 
of improvisation and especially innovation, as used below, may differ from a series of 
“standard” definitions. Second, and this is vastly important, the three forms of creativity deal 
in a sense with “ideal types” and, in practice, they often glide into one another and can be 
analytically hard to distinguish for several reasons, many of them discussed as follows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
Figure 2. The “nested” depiction of creative expression 
 
 The notion of improvisation commonly designates “something that was done to face 
some unforeseen circumstances” (Montuori, 2003, p. 245). It is this basic meaning that we 
employ here as well and, from this perspective, a person improvises when his or her 
(habitual) action is faced with an obstacle or difficulty. In the words of Bateson (1999, p. 
154), improvisation is “a way for individuals to bridge discontinuity”. Problems disrupt the 
“regular” ways we have of doing things and are thus calling for creative or novel forms of 
behaviour. This relationship between problems and creativity has deep historical roots and is 
reflected in current cognitive approaches defining creativity in problem-solving terms. 
However, despite this association, improvisational creativity as such has rarely constituted 
the focus of mainstream research. This is explained by authors like Sawyer (2000) as a 
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consequence of the nature of improvisation which, unlike product-based forms of creativity, 
is usually manifested in “performances”. In the case of improvisational creativity, on many 
occasions, “the process is the product” (Sawyer, 2000, p. 150) and improvised performances 
are characterised by contingency, emergence and participatory learning (Sawyer, 1997, p. 4). 
For Ingold and Hallam (2007, p. 3) improvisation is generative, relational, temporal, and 
expresses “the way we work”. This last feature already raises an interesting point of 
connection between habitual and improvisational creativity and comes to argue for the 
continuity between the two. In the words of Liep (2001, p. 2), “improvisation indicates a 
more conventional exploration of possibilities within a certain framework of rules” (also a 
framework of habits we could say, to use our terminology). 
 Improvised jazz sessions constitute a prototypical example of improvisational activity, 
one that is very much able to shed light not only on the processes of improvisation itself but 
also on their connection to habitual forms of behaviour. To begin with, it is important to note 
that jazz sessions, for as spontaneous as they may be, always occur “in a context, and [are] 
performed by someone with a history, with cultural, economic, political, and philosophical 
contexts, with perspectives, habits, and eccentricities, with the ability to make choices in 
context, which choices in turn affect the context” (Montuori, 2003, p. 246). Inherently taking 
place in collaborations, jazz improvisation relies on two kinds of processes, as distinguished 
by Setton (2005): a sympathetic type of attunement, based on collectively sharing a stock of 
musical knowledge and experience, and, more importantly, an empathetic kind of attunement, 
relying on decentration and introspection in order to generate an atmosphere of trust, 
conducive for creative risk-taking and spontaneous expression. This does not mean that the 
repertoire of shared cultural knowledge is less significant, on the contrary, Sawyer (2003, p. 
114) makes the clear point that “improvisation always occurs within a structure, and all 
improvisers draw on ready-mades, short motifs or clichés – as they create their novel 
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performance”. Moreover, stressing even further the link between habitually acquired motifs 
and practices and the generation of novel performances, Sawyer continues by saying that jazz 
musicians “practice and perform the same songs repeatedly, and can often express themselves 
more effectively when they have a predeveloped set of musical ideas available”. Repetition 
and exercise may introduce a certain regularity and predictability in any performance but, at 
the same time, there would be no performance in their absence. What to an outsider could 
seem improvised on the spot is often the result of hours and hours of practice, an outcome 
resulting our of “snippets the players had played hundreds of times before” (Becker, 2000, p. 
171). The notions of “rehearsed spontaneity” and “planned serendipity” (Mirvis, 1998; see 
also Vera & Crossan, 2005) might sound oxymoronic but are very much fitting with the 
vision of mastery presented at the beginning of this article (see Figure 1).           
 Improvisation thus draws from habit and succeeds in shaping it, “compelled” by the 
fact that “no system of codes, rules and norms can anticipate every possible circumstance” 
(Ingold & Hallam, 2007, p. 2). One can never create or improvise something from noting 
(Lemons, 2005; Kamoche & Cunha, 2001; Mirvis, 1998) and “improvisational freedom is 
only possible against a well-defined (and often simple) backdrop of rules and roles” 
(Eisenberg, 1990, p. 154). This is how we can conclude, together with Küpers (2011, p. 115), 
that “spontaneity and improvisation must be anchored in habitual patterns of behaviour”. This 
is necessarily so because habits play a multitude of roles in relation to improvised expression: 
they are the generator and organiser of such practices, offer them structure and consistency 
over time, and remove the possibility of totally chaotic creation (Slutskaya, 2006, p. 154). On 
the other hand, “during improvisation the in-habited „world‟ and its habitual realities or 
practices are reconfigured, and the order and meaning established by given conventional 
procedures are disrupted” (Kupers, 2011, p. 117). For these reasons, the distinction between 
habitual and improvisational creativity can become blurred and expose their fundamental 
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intertwining: habitual action generally presupposes micro-improvisational acts since, as 
Dalton (2004, p. 615) rightfully remarked, “the problem is a general difficulty in all moments 
of action”. There is an important overlap between habit and improvisation and, based on our 
definition of “problem” (see Dewey, 1910, p. 9), we can more easily or not observe the 
differences between the two. It is argued in this article however that improvisational forms of 
creativity, working from within habitual action, can be distinguished for both analytical and 
practical purposes and a valuable indicator in this regard is, for instance, when activity stops 
because of encountered difficulties or when, just as in the case of jazz or improvised theatre 
performances, responses are contingent on moment to moment inputs received from the play 
of others; improvised “solutions” in these circumstances re-use, alter or combine habitual 
forms and, when they are successful, become a constitutive part of future habitual action.  
 Unlike habitual and improvisational creativity, innovative expressions of the 
phenomenon have constituted the central theme of creativity research in psychology for 
decades. Our definition of the term here is in line with the conception of several other 
authors, for example Weisberg (2006, p. 761) who claimed that an innovation “emerges when 
an individual intentionally produces something new in attempting to meet some goal” and 
Kaufman and Kaufman (2004, p. 148), for whom the ability to innovate means creative 
something that is new and different “with the specific understanding that is new and 
different”. While sometimes the process of innovation is conceptualised as “the practical 
application of creative ideas” (Westwood & Law, 2003, p. 236), the notion is not used now 
with such applied connotations. Innovative creativity is considered in our context simply as 
the act of addressing a difficulty or problem with the intention not only of “solving” it, but 
solving it in a creative or novel way. As an “intentionally creative” type of action, innovative 
creativity normally leads to physical products which can be more easily observed and 
evaluated. The great works of art, inventions and scientific theories are to a large extent the 
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outcome of this particular form of expression. The mere presence of a creative intention, it 
seems, can make a significant difference in how people respond to a task and can, in most 
circumstances, increase the level of creativity. This observation is supported by a series of 
studies that made use of explicit instructions to “be creative” when answering different 
creativity tests (Harrington, 1975; Runco & Okuda, 1991), an effect tested on several 
populations, including children (Lee, Bain & McCallum, 2007), as well as participants from 
different cultures (Chen, Kasof, Himsel, Dmitrieva, Dong & Gui, 2005).     
 However, truly innovative acts performed outside of the laboratory or testing rooms 
and studied by creativity researchers are normally Big C type of achievements. From this 
perspective one can conclude that traditional models of the creative process in psychology are 
meant to explain first and foremost innovative behaviours: for example Wallas‟s (1926) 
succession of preparation – incubation – illumination – verification applies very well to 
deliberate, medium or long-term creative work. Even typologies of the creative outcome 
favour innovation and we can take here the example of the Propulsion model (see Sternberg, 
1999; Sternberg, Kaufman & Pretz, 2002), discriminating eight different ways of being 
creative, all requiring an awareness of the field one is working in and as well as a more or 
less conscious decision to position and express oneself in a particular way, in relation to 
existing paradigms (either accepting, rejecting or trying to integrate them). Conceptually 
close to this typology, the investment theory of creativity (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995a&b) 
starts from the clear premise that creativity is basically a decision (see also Sternberg, 
Kaufman & Grigorenko, 2008). According to this account, creative persons buy low when 
they present a unique idea and try to convince others of its value. Once gaining recognition 
for their innovation, they sell high by leaving the idea to others and moving on to another 
neglected area they can invest it and exploit further. This hypothesised trajectory seems to 
apply well in the case of established creators (such as Matisse, Monet, Beckmann and 
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Guston) who remained creative over the course of their entire career because of their capacity 
to deliberately “select novel goal constrains and second, to strategically select source, task, 
and subject constraints to help realize them” (Stokes & Fisher, 2005, p. 291). To be sure, 
inventive creativity is not by any means portrayed in this context as an inherently “superior” 
type of creativity (reproducing a common bias in both scientific theory and lay thinking on 
the topic) since, as we argued before, extremely valuable creations can come out of habitual 
and/or improvisational processes alone. The intention to create doesn‟t guarantee the 
“quality” of the work, and its absence doesn‟t make the outcome any less “creative” 
(especially since creativity itself is a matter of social agreement; Glӑveanu, 2010b).  
 At the same time, we should keep in mind that innovative creativity here is considered 
to be a particular case embedded within improvisational and habitual fields of action. Habit 
and invention are continuous since, as mentioned by Baldwin (1906, p. 180), “effective 
invention is always rooted in the knowledge already possessed by society” and “no effective 
invention ever makes an absolute break with the culture, tradition, fund of knowledge 
treasured up from the past”. On the whole though it is acknowledge that some habits can lead 
to innovation while others can hinder it (Cavangnoli, 2008), particularly in organisational 
settings. One way in which managers could capitalise on existing habits and stimulate 
breakthrough innovation is by harnessing the pool of tacit knowledge possessed by 
individuals and entire teams (Mascitelli, 2000). In a similar vein, to understand the 
connection between improvisation and innovation one can think about concrete examples 
from industry in which teams innovate successfully using an improvisational approach (see 
Sawyer, 2006; although past research has shown that engaging in improvisation does not 
necessarily or immediately lead to innovation, Vera & Crossan, 2005). As for the important 
differences between the two, they have been captured quite well by Lévi-Strauss‟s (1966) 
distinction between the bricoleur and the engineer. Improvisational processes are very often a 
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form of bricolage, of making the best with what is at hand while generally remaining within a 
set of existing rules; in contrast, “the engineer is always trying to make his way out of and go 
beyond the constraints imposed by a particular state of civilization” (Lévi-Strauss‟s, 1966, p. 
19; see also Louridas, 1999). Hence, if both improvisation and innovation can be associated 
with problem solving activities then the later usually reveals a more proactive type of 
creativity, where problems are not simply encountered but often looked for, anticipated and 
intentionally formulated (see Runco, 2007b). Having said that, the boundaries between these 
two phenomena are often blurred by the fact that creative intentions (specific for innovation) 
tend to exist among other motivating factors (e.g., doing a good job, making others happy, 
enjoying the activity, etc.). This brings back the example of jazz performances, in which “a 
commonly shared goal is to create within a musical and social context, requiring both control 
and spontaneity, constraints and possibilities, innovation and tradition, leading and 
supporting” (Montuori, 2003, p. 239). Furthermore, musicians who improvise retain certain 
works in their repertoire and perfect them along many years (Dobbins, 1980), thus 
demonstrating how an act of improvisation can become, in time, one of innovation.  
 In concluding, habit, improvisation and innovation are not three separate forms of 
creative expression but refer to three instances of the same basic process. As such, they are 
sometimes hard to differentiate, especially at a micro-level of analysis, and there are many 
“grey zones” to be considered between them. However, this classification is necessary as it 
allows us to appreciate the simultaneous diversity and internal unity of creative 
manifestations. To exemplify it with the case of craft, in traditional Easter egg decoration one 
can identify all three types while looking at the work of different decorators or of one and the 
same decorator across time. On the whole, this practice can be said to illustrate best the 
mechanisms of habitual creativity. This is because decoration activities rely on a strong 
knowledge base and require the exercise of technique through reproducing and combining a 
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number of traditional motifs as well as perfecting them. The stages, properties of materials, 
work procedures, are all learned from early on and this considerably reduces the number of 
difficulties encountered. To be sure, obstacles are not absent and therefore artisans become 
improvisers when confronted with “accidents” in drawing or colouring, due to failure of the 
material support or when they experience “inspiration blocks” (AUTHOR REFERENCE). 
Inventing (e.g., coming up with a new motif or work technique) is also constant in this folk 
art but mostly as part of habitual-improvisational forms of expression. Decorators want to 
express themselves through their work and to continue a tradition they value and not 
necessarily to “create” or “change” things for the sake of change. Innovation in Easter egg 
making is mostly led by necessity rather than innovative creativity, in the sense offered here 
to the term. Still, there are cases of recognised innovators who deliberately search for 
novelties, mostly in order to respond to the changing needs of customers and expand the 
market. This is how Christmas eggs or the wax in relief procedure of decoration got 
“invented” and, rapidly spreading to other decorators in the region and in the country, became 
part of existing habitual practices and thus subject to continuous re-interpretation and 
improvisation. In the words of Sennett (2008, p. 9), “Every good craftsman conducts a 
dialogue between concrete practices and thinking; this dialogue evolves into sustaining 
habits, and these habits establish a rhythm between problem solving and problem finding”.   
On the neglect of habit and improvisation  
 Towards the end, it is important to make a few observations about the relative neglect 
of habitual and improvisational creativity in psychology and its unintended consequences. On 
the whole we can consider these types of expression as representing the core of “everyday 
life creativity”, the creativity that permeates all dimensions of our existence (Montuori, 
2011). However, this is not to say that everyday life is opposed to innovative forms and 
associate the latter exclusively with achievements in art and science. As the previous sections 
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strived to argue, “ordinary” creativity can lead to innovation and innovations themselves 
grow out of a habitual and improvisational basis. And yet, it was often the case for scholars to 
focus “on eminent or unambiguous rather than everyday creativity” (Runco, 2007a, p. x), 
which, although a clear sign of our “vibrant symbolic life”, unfortunately is “sometimes 
invisible, looked down on or spurned” (Willis, 1990, p. 1). In agreement with Richards (2007, 
p. 26), we can assert that “our [everyday] creativity is often underrecognized, 
underdeveloped, and underrewarded, in schools, at work, and at home”. The reasons for this 
are both theoretical and methodological.  
 To begin with, contemporary (Western or Westernised) societies are based on a 
glorification of “big C” creativity, great creations and extraordinary creators. This steams to a 
large extent from a general vision of the opposition between individuals on the one hand, 
society and culture on the other (Slater, 1991). The implications of this are widespread, for 
example, focusing on eminent creative achievement alone “precludes the study and 
understanding of more common forms of creativity” and can “fuel problematic beliefs and 
stereotypes about the nature of creativity” (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007, p. 74). This is 
especially the case for aspiring creators who, in order to achieve social recognition, 
frequently feel the pressure of departing from what already exists in radical ways, of 
“fighting” against convention. Indeed, in the arts, “totally conventional pieces bore everyone 
and bring the artist few rewards. So artists, to be successful in producing art, must violate 
standards more or less deeply internalized” (Becker, 2008, p. 204). Habitual creativity is 
therefore completely excluded by this logic. Improvisation may be more appreciated in art 
but, for the most part, it can also carry some undesirable associations with “makeshift” and 
“the next best thing”. In the words of Montuori (2003, p. 245), “improvisation is thought of 
as making the best of things, while awaiting a return to the way things should be done”. The 
oftentimes “ephemeral” nature of its products (Sawyer, 1997) further decreases its value and 
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makes it “resistant to operationalization and analysis” (Sawyer, 1995, p. 173). In addition, a 
series of methodological difficulties need to be confronted by those interested in habitual and 
improvisational creativity, principally the fact that they require a microgenetic and situated 
approach. To understand the nature of habit and improvisation one has to see them in the 
broader, social and material context of their emergence, as well as their moment-to-moment 
dynamics (for a proposal in this regard see AUTHOR REFERENCE).  
 The neglect of everyday life forms of creativity not only “deprives us of a range of 
models for the creative process” (Bateson, 1999, p. 153) but, according to the perspective 
adopted here, it deprives us of some of the most important and basic models of creative 
processes, those for habitual expression. This is all the more surprising since it has been 
argued for a while in the psychology of creativity, especially by authors like Weisberg 
(1993), that “novelty is the norm of all behaviour” and that “ordinary thinking processes” 
produce novel works of value and “must underlie even the most exalted examples of creative 
thinking” (p. 11). For Weisberg, “a cornerstone of the concept of ordinary thinking is that it is 
based on continuity with the past” (p. 21), a definition which is very much in line with the 
notion of habitual creativity. By reviewing laboratory studies and historical examples, he 
offered compelling evidence that the processes (e.g. continuity based on near analogies, 
discontinuities based on reasoning and sensitivity to external events; p. 255) which lead to 
extraordinary creative achievements are not qualitatively different from the ones we use in 
our daily activities. In a formulation by Bink and Mash (2000, p. 60), “these processes do not 
functionally differ between the genius and those who appear (prima facie) less gifted”. In 
fact, the dominant creative cognition approach (see Ward, Smith & Finke, 1999, p. 189) is 
founded on the assumption that “creative accomplishments, from the most mundane to the 
most extraordinary, are based on (...) ordinary mental processes that, at least in principle, are 
observable”. And yet, despite this similarity of perspective, cognitive studies for the most part 
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did not inquire into the nature of habit itself and employed a series of laboratory experiments 
generally remote from the nature and complexities of everyday life action. . 
 The theoretical perspective put forward in this article makes some simple and yet 
consequential distinctions between different types of creative expression while emphasising 
their intrinsic unity as ultimately grounded in habitual forms of activity. In this context habit 
is understood in more open, flexible and reflective ways than it is specific for mainstream 
psychological literature. The vision of the embeddedness of “higher” manifestations of 
creativity in basic action and thought processes is not a novel proposal in itself. In fact, 
Runco (2007b, p. 103) for instance argued recently that both people who are not usually 
creative and creative luminaries equally “rely on the same processes and mechanisms for 
their creativity”, essentially a personal creativity expressed in the generation of original 
interpretations and understandings of one‟s daily experience. This can easily be connected 
back to the existential meaning of habitual creativity previously referred to or the idea of 
“mini-c” type of creations. In fact, Beghetto and Kaufman (2007) already made the claim that 
little-c and Big-C expressions necessarily have their genesis in mini-c interpretations: “in 
most cases, mini-c can become little-c; in extraordinary cases, little-c may then turn into Big-
C” (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007, p. 76). Parallels can be drawn here to our discussion of 
habit, improvisation and innovation (without assuming a one-to-one correspondence between 
these typologies). As for our conception, empirical evidence concerning the relationships 
between habitual, improvisational and innovative creativity is gradually accumulating. For 
instance, Chua and Iyengar (2008) examined the effect of prior experience (habitual action in 
our model) and explicit instruction (initiating the innovative drive to “be creative”) on 
creative performance when respondents have a high degree of choice in how they approach 
the task (a basic condition for improvisational behaviour). It was found, in two experiments, 
that superior creative achievement is obtained only in situations in which participants have 
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both experience in the task domain and are prompted to make an effort to innovate. As 
concluded by the authors, creativity seems to require “a „perfect storm‟ of high choice, high 
prior experience, and explicit creativity instructions” (Chua & Iyengar, 2008, p. 169). 
Some concluding remarks 
 The present article argued against a dichotomic understanding of creativity and habit, 
rooted in the psycho-physiological vision of habitual action as automatic, almost mindless 
activity. It was shown here how an alternative conception of habit is not only possible, but 
was actually preferred by several great psychologists from the beginning of last century, and 
is also elaborated in related disciplines. Considering the substantial literature on creativity as 
action developed in sociology, it is bewildering to see that little of this debate has entered 
psychology or preoccupied creativity researchers. There are various reasons for this, from the 
general scarcity of interdisciplinary endeavours to the highly experimental and sometimes 
atheoretical approach cultivated today by many books and journals in the psychology of 
creativity. Studies that are currently done look at parts of the issue, for instance the 
importance of the knowledge base (Wiseberg, 1999) or the role of self-imposed constraints 
(Storr, 2001, 2006), but often miss the whole, the integrated expression of creativity in human 
action. It was argued above that, with this tendency, great opportunities are lost, both in terms 
of theory and practice. The former is exemplified by a strong trend of confining creativity to 
the mind, almost exclusively to cognition, and therefore losing sight of the co-ordination 
between thought and action, between the simultaneously “internal” and “external” dynamic 
of creativity. Creative cognition deals with regularities of thinking and less with regularities 
of action, and, as such, cannot address alone the complexities of habit, which is grounded in 
the interaction between person and a social and material environment. This has important 
consequences, particularly for how we recognise creativity and legitimise who and what is 
“creative” and hence valuable. Re-evaluating and re-valuing habit as an intrinsically creative 
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manifestation would not only open up a whole new field of inquiry but also direct our 
attention towards the creativity each of us displays in our everyday contacts with others and 
with the world. In this regard, making the phenomenon “ordinary” rather than “extra-
ordinary”, takes nothing away from our appreciation of it in its highest forms, on the 
contrary, it can inspire our efforts to reach them.      
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